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FETAL PROTECTION LAWS AND THE
“PERSONHOOD” PROBLEM: TOWARD A
RELATIONAL THEORY OF FETAL LIFE
AND REPRODUCTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
Amanda Gvozden*
Fetal Protection Laws (FPLs) are laws that define and provide
punishments for any number of crimes, including homicide, committed
“against a fetus.”1 Previous literature has suggested that FPLs need to be
explicit about who the intended target of this legislation is.2 Specifically,
comments concerned about the use of FPLs against pregnant women in
relation to their own pregnancies suggested that states include language in
their FPLs that make it clear that the law ought not be applied to women for
harm to their own fetuses. Indeed, some states like California have taken
measures to curtail the application of FPLs to protect women from
prosecution for the injury or death of their own fetus.3 However, in recent
years, despite these explicit constraints, cases have emerged in California
that do just this: prosecute women for harm to their own fetus.4 So why, if
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School of Law, JD/PhD anticipated 2024. University of Chicago M.A., Dickinson College
B.A. with Honors. Thank you to Professor Deborah Tuerkheimer for your support, guidance
and expertise, without which this Comment would not be possible, to the student editors of
the Journal of Criminal and Criminology for your feedback, dedication, and immeasurable
patience, and to the National Advocates for Pregnant Women for their tireless work
championing the rights of pregnant women.
1
See infra Part II.
2
See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New
Constitutional Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 783 (2014); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438 (1991).
3
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
4
People v. Perez, No. F077851, 2019 WL 1349709 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019);
[Proposed] Brief of the California Attorney General in Support of Petitioner Chelsea Becker
at 1, 5–6, Becker v. Super. Ct. of Kings Cnty., No. F081341 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2020).
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states are clearly exempting pregnant women from prosecution for their own
injured fetuses, are such prosecutions still being undertaken?
This Comment suggests that the problem lies in the fetal personhood
theory now underlying these FPLs. FPLs not only provide protective rights
to fetuses, but in doing so, define the fetus as a legal person. Under this
framework, it becomes impossible not to prosecute the mother for harm
because she and the fetus are separate legal persons with separate legal
rights and protections. However, there is an alternative.
Drawing from feminist care theory and distributive justice, this
Comment proposes that rather than consider the fetus and the mother as
separate legal entities, the fetus and the mother should be seen as one fetalmaternal entity with rights flowing through the mother. This Comment refers
to this theory as the Fetal Maternal Identity Theory (FMIT). Rather than
seeing the mother and fetus as independent entities, FMIT correctly
recognizes the unique relationality between the fetus and its mother and
reconceives of rights as incumbent upon this relationship. Because the fetus
is necessarily dependent upon the mother, all of its rights, like its identity and
very existence, are afforded to it through and in relation to its mother.
This theory solves several problems. First, it helps to define the problem
facing states that seek not to prosecute women for harm to their fetuses but
find it impossible to do so. Second, it provides the foundation for a new theory
of relationality that better appreciates the complex condition of pregnancy
and protects women from harm and unjust prosecution. Ultimately, beyond
its function, FMIT better apprehends the conditions of pregnancy and
provides a well-grounded framework for redistributing responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
Personhood is a foundational element of the American legal system.5 To
be imbued with rights or encumbered with duties, an entity must first be
identified as a “legal person.”6 To this end, much legal and philosophical
work has gone into making sense of exactly what a “legal person” is.7 One
significant question in this debate relates to the legal status of non-human
persons. Animals are afforded some degree of legal rights, but are they
persons? Since Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.8 there
have been serious questions about the legal personhood of corporations.9 But
5

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For example, notice the distinction made
between protections afforded to “person” and “citizen”: “All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Id.
6
See Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 283 (1928).
7
For a sampling of contemporary legal and philosophical work on the issue of “legal
personhood,” see, for example, KIM ATKINS, NARRATIVE IDENTITY AND MORAL IDENTITY: A
PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE (2008); LYNN RUDDER BAKER, PERSONS AND BODIES: A
CONSTITUTION VIEW (2000); THE MORAL STATUS OF PERSONS: PERSPECTIVES ON BIOETHICS
(Gerhold K. Becker ed., 2000); DAVID DEGRAZIA, HUMAN IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS (2005);
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE SELF (Shaun Gallagher ed., 2011); VISA A.J. KURKI, A
THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD (2019).
8
118 U.S. 394, 404 (1886).
9
For a catalogue of historical and legal debates concerning corporate personhood and the
formation of corporate persons, see, for example, Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood
and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 785 (2013) (cataloguing the debate over
corporate personhood, offering a functionalist analysis of existing literature on the question of
corporate personhood, and concluding by offering a historical evaluation of the corporate form
specifically related to how and why corporations have formed corporate personas).
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one status in question—that is the subject of some of the most intense
debate—is the legal status of fetuses. Are fetuses legal persons? Do fetuses
have rights?
Some states have chosen to answer this question explicitly by granting
fetuses rights through Fetal Protection Laws (FPLs).10 These laws variously
grant fetuses rights,11 define fetuses as persons,12 and provide extra
protections to pregnant women unavailable to non-pregnant persons.13
Beyond merely granting fetuses legal rights, FPLs have other secondary
consequences on the rights of the women.14 General Fetal Protection Laws
(GFPLs)15 have, by granting fetuses separate rights, placed women in an
adversarial relationship with their fetus.16 This has meant, in some cases, that
women have been held criminally responsible for injury or death caused to
their own fetuses.17
Some FPLs already have exemptions that are meant to preclude women
from prosecution of harm to their own fetuses.18 However, even for laws that
explicitly state that they should not be used to the detriment of pregnant
women, such as California’s FPLs,19 recent cases have been brought against

10

See infra Part II.
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Goodwin recounts that “[s]tates and their lawmakers invoke a range of chilling
arguments to support the establishment of fetal rights and impose limits on women’s
reproductive rights.” Michele Goodwin, If Embryos and Fetuses Have Rights, 11 L. & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 189, 194 (2017). One such argument is that if the fetus is a person, its life must be
protected at all costs. Id. at 194, 197–98. The value of that human life supersedes the burden
placed on a woman to bear that life, even if she were the victim of incest or rape. Id. at 197–
98; see also Lawrence J. Nelson, Brian P. Buggy & Carol J. Weil, Forced Medical Treatment
of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live As Seems Good to the Rest, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
703, 704 (1986); Can a Corpse Give Birth?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/28/opinion/pregnancy-exclusion-law.html [https://perma
.cc/NR39-KY37].
15
See infra Part II.
16
Goodwin, supra note 14, at 208; Joyce E. McConnell, Relational and Liberal
Feminism: The “Ethic of Care,” Fetal Personhood and Autonomy, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 291,
307 (1996); Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1333 (1990).
17
See, e.g., People v. Perez, No. F077851, 2019 WL 1349709 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar.
26, 2019); [Proposed] Brief of the California Attorney General in Support of Petitioner
Chelsea Becker, supra note 4, at 1, 5–6; Victoria Browne, The Politics of Miscarriage, 2.03
RADICAL PHIL. 61, 61–62 (2018).
18
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
19
Id.
11
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women for harm caused to their own fetuses.20 The emergence of these new
cases in states that have enacted specific language protecting pregnant
women is of great importance and immediate concern. How is it that states
that have explicitly attempted to alleviate the dangers caused by FPLs are
still using FPLs to target and punish pregnant women for harm to their
fetuses? This Comment proposes that the impossibility of overcoming the
personhood problem in FPLs is the reason that even the best-intentioned
states cannot avoid unjustly prosecuting women for their own pregnancies.
FPLs that attach rights to fetuses as separate persons create the inescapable
problem of legally protecting those persons against harm with retributive
justice.21 Once an entity is afforded independent rights and defined as a
person, it becomes nearly impossible for the state not to punish those who
harm it, through whatever means and regardless of their relationship.
Language that specifies the identity and rights of the fetus might help. But in
reality, exempting women from this sort of prosecution is not beyond what
state laws largely already provide in their own language.
A. THEORETICAL INTERVENTION: RELATIONSHIPS, RIGHTS, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES

One way out of this quagmire would be to declare fetuses to be nonhuman and non-persons. However, this engages the state in ethical and
existential questions that are not only inappropriate, but in which the state
has no expertise.22 Another way of approaching this problem is by
circumventing the “human” and “person” discussion and engaging instead in
a conversation about relationships and responsibilities. This Comment does
just that.
20

E.g., People v. Perez, No. F077851, 2019 WL 1349709 at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26,
2019); [Proposed] Brief of the California Attorney General in Support of Petitioner Chelsea
Becker, supra note 4, at 1, 5–6. In both cases, the women were charged with “feticide” by
“harming” their fetus due to drug use during pregnancy. These diagnoses are contentious on
their own as the cause of death of a fetus is often unclear. But moreover, charging women for
“harm” caused to their own fetuses through the use of illicit substances flies in the face of
FPLs’ purposes and fails to protect women from serious illnesses and from the law.
21
Retributive justice is a theory of punishment that holds that, when an individual is
convicted of having committed a crime, justice is best served by imposing suffering on the
individual proportional to the harm they caused. In essence, the suffering of the offender is
the main object of retributive punishment, as opposed to rehabilitation or simple detainment.
ANTHONY DUFF & STUART P. GREEN, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 1, 433–
61 (2011)
22
Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Abortion, Moral Law, and the First Amendment: The Conflict
Between Fetal Rights & Freedom of Religion, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 271, 321
(2017); Steven L. Skahn, Abortion Laws, Religious Beliefs and the First Amendment, 14 VAL.
U. L. REV. 487, 523 (1980).
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Feminist theories of identity have long purported that women exist in a
network of relationships rather than as atomistic, autonomous individuals.23
The fetal-maternal relationship, they suggest, is the epitome of this sort of
relational identity because of its uniquely necessary, rather than
discretionary, relationality.24 By drawing from feminist theories of identity,
this Comment suggests a theory of identity that circumvents the personhood
question and instead focuses on the provision of rights as part of a relational
system.
Rights should be afforded to individuals in relation to one another.
Because fetuses have a necessary and constitutive relationship with the
women that bear them, fetuses should only be afforded rights through the
rights afforded to women, not as an independent entity.25 A fetus is
necessarily reliant on a woman for sustenance and existence. In essence, this
means that, for legal purposes, the fetus is identical to the woman.26 But
because the woman is not in relationship with the fetus or dependent upon it
in the same way as the fetus is her, the woman is not identical to her fetus.27
Thus, this theory would conceive of the fetus and its mother as a new
maternal-fetal person that bears rights through reference to the woman
exclusively.
In this sense, a fetus cannot claim independent rights because it does not
function independently, only at the support and discretion of the woman who
bears it. Rights essentially “flow through” the woman to her fetus, and fetuses
are only afforded protection to the extent that the woman is protected because
of this unique relationship of necessary dependence.28

23

CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 1, 24–64 (1982); NEL NODDINGS, CARING: A
FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION 1, 65–69 (1984); GRACE CLEMENT,
CARE, AUTONOMY AND JUSTICE: FEMINISM AND THE ETHIC OF CARE 1, 22–35 (1996).
24
IRIS MARION YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL AND OTHER ESSAYS IN FEMINIST
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL THEORY 163 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant
Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 705 (2006).
25
This construction of rights mirrors the thinking found in Judith Jarvis Thomson, A
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 47, 48–49 (1971). In this piece, Jarvis Thomson
outlines the “Famous Violinist Problem” explaining the fundamental and incomparable
relationship that fetuses have with the women who bear them. Id. Because of this relationship,
the fetus does not have a separate claim to rights but is subject to the will of the person
supporting them and supplying them with life. Id.
26
KURKI, supra note 7, at 147–48.
27
Id.
28
See sources cited supra note 27.
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In this system, then, responsibility, like rights, would be distributed
through a network of relations.29 Rather than holding a woman exclusively
responsible for the care of the fetus, and implicitly herself, this theory of
relational identity and responsibility would insist that tertiary actors in
relation to the woman be held responsible for ensuring her health and safety
in a network of care.30
Such a system would solve a number of problems. Women and their
fetuses would no longer be antagonists because the fetus would not be a
cognizable separate legal entity that could claim rights separately from and
potentially against its mother. Women could not be held liable for harm
caused to their fetuses because, on one hand, the fetus being identical to the
mother would be merely caring for or harming herself by caring for or
harming her fetus, and on the other, with responsibility made diffuse, there
would now exist a network of individuals and systems in relationship who
would be responsible for caring for the woman and, by extension, her fetus.
Ultimately, this Comment does two things: it proposes a novel,
alternative theory to current fetal personhood theories that is based on
relationships rather than autonomous rights, and it applies this new theory to
contemporary problems in the policing of pregnancy to demonstrate how a
novel theory of personhood would better apprehend the reality of pregnancy
and protect pregnant women.
B. ARGUMENT AND STRUCTURE

This Comment begins by grounding the discussion of fetal personhood
theory in historical context. Part II moves from the history of fetal
personhood to a new theory of identity grounded in relationality. First, this
Comment argues that problems caused by attaching rights to fetal persons
might be avoided by circumventing the personhood question entirely,
focusing instead on relationships. Second, this Comment extends this theory
of relationality to explore the imposition of responsibilities as well as the
provision of rights. Part III then applies this new relational theory to
persistent problems in the policing of pregnancy and explains how this
revised version of relational identity and responsibility will solve problems
caused by the fetal personhood movement and FPLs. Part IV follows by
addressing possible critiques of this theory of relational identity and
responsibility.

29

Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities:
Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4, 22–23 (1996).
30
Id. at 23.

414

GVOZDEN

[Vol. 112

I. THE HISTORY OF PERSONHOOD AND FETAL RIGHTS
The question of life arises most frequently in legislation in cases
involving the destruction of a fetus.31 At early common law, the fetus was
not considered alive for somewhere between several days to several months
after conception.32 Even then, a fetus was not considered a human being and
the killing of a fetus was not homicide unless the fetus had been “born
alive”33 and established an “independent circulation.”34 Indeed, the court in
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton maintained that to consider a fetus as
“on the same footing as . . . an existing person” would be illogical because
no “quasi independent life” could be maintained by a fetus.35 Ultimately, the
consensus was fairly universal that only independent life could be recognized
by law.36 More recently, however, both federal and state legislation have
recognized and provided legal protections for the fetus. The federal Unborn
Victim of Violence Act (UVVA) of 2004 recognizes an embryo or fetus in
utero as a legal victim and defines an unborn child as a child in utero, or a
“member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is
carried in the womb.”37
Following the example of the UVVA, some states passed “Fetal
Protection Laws” (FPLs) that added separate causes of action for harmed
fetuses, enhanced penalties for harm done to pregnant women, and/or defined

31

See, e.g., Carol A. Tauer, Personhood and Human Embryos and Fetuses, 10 J. MED. &
PHIL. 253, 253 (1985); Jean Reith Schroedel, Pamela Fiber & Bruce D. Snyder, Women’s
Rights and Fetal Personhood in Criminal Law, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 90 (2000);
John Janez Miklavcic & Paul Flaman, Personhood Status of the Human Zygote, Embryo,
Fetus, 84 LINACRE Q. 130, 130 (2017).
32
Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Law of New York Concerning Abortion and the Status of the
Foetus, 1664–1968: A Case of Cessation of Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411, 412, 420
(1968).
33
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 14.1(c) (3d ed. 2020); Stanley B.
Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live-Birth, 17 HARV. L. REV. 589, 589 (1904); Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 96 S.W.2d 1014, 1015 (Ky. 1936).
34
State v. Winthrop, 43 Iowa 519, 520 (1876).
35
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884) (emphasis added).
This case was later abrogated by Angelini v. OMD Corp., 575 N.E.2d 41 (Mass. 1991), which
involved injured automobile passengers, and a passenger’s child who was nonviable fetus at
time of accident who sued driver and restaurants that allegedly served driver alcoholic
beverages. Id. at 41–42. The court held that, among other things, a child who was conceived
before his or her parents suffered nonfatal injuries caused by negligence of defendant and was
subsequently born alive was not precluded from recovering for loss of parental consortium.
Id. at 43–44.
36
Schroedel, Fiber & Snyder, supra note 31, at 90; Miklavcic & Flaman, supra note 32,
at 130.
37
18 U.S.C. § 1841.
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a fetus as a human life from the earliest stages of development.38 The great
majority of these provisions apply back to the beginnings of the pregnancy
by stating that they cover an unborn child at “any stage of development”39 or
from “fertilization”40 or “conception.”41 Several other statutes cover only an
“unborn quick child,”42 while only a few refer to a “fetus”43 or “unborn
child”44 without further definition. In general, though, among these laws
there is little daylight between the terms “human” and “fetus.” Currently, at
least thirty-seven states have fetal homicide laws: Alabama*,45 Alaska*,46
38
See State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes Against
Pregnant Women, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (May 1, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/6YSM-22NX].
39
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900
(West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1102 (Westlaw
through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg.
Sess.); IND. CODE §§ 35-41-1-1, 35-41-1-3, 35-41-1-4 (West 2021); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 2-103 (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-389
(LEXIS through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.1 (LEXIS through Sess. Law
2021-162); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 116); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-201 (West, Westlaw through 2021 2nd Spec. Sess.)).
40
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:2
(Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.09 (West, Westlaw through
File 70 of 134th Gen. Assemb.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.,
Act 100); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Legis. Sess.); W. VA.
CODE § 61-2-30 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Sess.).
41
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507A.010 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.266
(Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (West, Westlaw through
2021 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 (LEXIS through 2021 Spec. Sess.); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 21, § 691 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.).
42
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.322 (Westlaw through 2021 Pub. L. No. 168); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.210 (Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 33rd Spec. Sess. (2021)); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 23-5 (LEXIS through Ch. 424 of 2021 Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West,
Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. § 940.04 (LEXIS through Act 118 of 2021–22
Legis. Sess.). The R.I. provision goes on to define a “quick child” as an unborn with a
heartbeat, brain waves, and development to the point as to be capable of survival.
43
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (LEXIS through 2021 Legis. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4001,
18-4006, 18-4016 (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.) Regarding the California law,
in People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591, 602 (Cal. 1994), the court concluded that viability was not
necessary and that seven to eight weeks of development would suffice.
44
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2 (Westlaw through P.A. 102-178 of 2021 Reg.
Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:2
(Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (LEXIS through 2021 Reg.
Sess.); MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (LEXIS through 2021 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
45
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-1 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
46
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.41.150, 11.81.250, 12.55.035, 12.55.125 (West, Westlaw
through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.).
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Arizona*,47 Arkansas*,48 California,49 Florida*,50 Georgia*,51 Idaho*,52
Illinois*,53 Indiana*,54 Kansas*,55 Kentucky*,56 Louisiana*,57 Maryland,58
Massachusetts,59 Michigan*,60 Minnesota*,61 Mississippi*,62 Missouri*,63
Montana,64 Nebraska*,65 Nevada,66 New Hampshire,67 North Carolina*,68
North Dakota*,69 Ohio*,70 Oklahoma*,71 Pennsylvania*,72 South

47
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1102–1105, 13-701, 13-704, 13-705, 13-751 (Westlaw
through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.).
48
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1-102(13), 5-10-101–05 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
49
CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
50
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.021(5) (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.).
51
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-5-80, 40-6-393.1, 52-7-12.3 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
52
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4001, -4006, -4016 (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg.
Sess.).
53
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2, 9-2.1, 9-3.2 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/12-3.1, 12-3.2, 12-4.4 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 5/3-6-3 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/2 (Westlaw
through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
54
IND. CODE § 35-50-2-16 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.).
55
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-5401 to 5406, 21-5413, 21-5419 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
56
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 439.3401, 507A.010 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg.
Sess.).
57
LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:2(7), 2(11), 32.5–32.8 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
58
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.).
59
MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24G (Westlaw through Ch. 14 of 2022 2d Ann. Sess.).
60
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.322, .323, .90a (Westlaw through 2021 Pub. L. No. 168).
61
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.205, .21, .266 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.).
62
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-7-13, 97-3-19, 97-3-37 (LEXIS through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
63
MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.2 (LEXIS through 2021 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
64
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102, 45-5-116 (Westlaw through 2021 Sess.).
65
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-388–97, 60-6,198 (LEXIS through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.).
66
NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.210 (Westlaw through Ch. 2 of 33rd Spec. Sess. (2021)).
67
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1 (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
68
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (LEXIS through Sess. Law 2021-162).
69
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-01 (LEXIS through 2021 Spec. Sess.).
70
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (West, Westlaw through File 70 of 134th Gen.
Assemb.).
71
OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 644 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 691 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess).
72
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 106, 2601 (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg.
Sess. Act 13); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg.
Sess. Act 13).
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Carolina*,73 South Dakota*,74 Tennessee*,75 Texas*,76 Utah*,77 Virginia,78
Washington,79 West Virginia*,80 and Wisconsin*,81 at least twenty-nine of
which have fetal homicide laws that apply to the earliest stages of
pregnancy.82 In some states these take the form of General Fetal Protection
Laws (GFPLs) that provide separate causes of action for a harmed fetus.83 In
others including Colorado,84 Connecticut,85 Delaware,86 Iowa,87 Maine,88
New Mexico,89 Oregon,90 and Wyoming91 these laws take the form of
“penalty-enhancement for crimes against pregnant women” and what this
Comment will refer to as Punishment Enhancement Laws (PEL).92
II. FETAL-MATERNAL IDENTITY AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE:
RELATIONAL THEORIES OF IDENTITY AND CARE
Pregnancy is fundamentally a relational state. The relationship between
fetus and its mother is necessarily dependent. Therefore, rather than
applying, as prior theories of fetal personhood have, theories of individual,
atomistic personhood93 to fetuses, Part A of this section proposes
73

S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-1083, -20(C)(a) (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 116).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-16-1.1, -4 (Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 16-41 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess.).
75
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-107, 13-214 (LEXIS through 2021 3rd Extraordinary Sess.).
76
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Legis. Sess).
77
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201 (West, Westlaw through 2021 2nd Spec. Sess.).
78
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-32.2 (LEXIS through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
79
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
80
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-30 (Westlaw through 2021 1st Sess.).
81
WIS. STAT. § 940.04(2) (LEXIS through Act 118 of 2021–22 Legis. Sess.).
82
As indicated by *. See “Summary of Statutes and Case Laws,” supra note 40.
83
Id.
84
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1.3-401(13)(a), 1.3-501(6), 1.3-1201 (LEXIS through 2021
Reg. Sess.).
85
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-924-59a, 924-59c, 924-60b, 942-60c, 924-61a (LEXIS
through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
86
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 11-5-605, 5-606 (LEXIS through 83 Del. Laws, c. 266)
87
IOWA CODE § 707.8 (LEXIS through 2021 Reg. Sess.).
88
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 208-C (LEXIS through 2021 Legis. Sess.).
89
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-7 (1996 through 1st Sess. 50th Legis.).
90
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.155, 163.160, 163.185 (LEXIS through 81st Legis. Assemb.).
91
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-502 (LEXIS through 2021 Gen & Spec. Sess.).
92
See State Laws on Fetal Homicide and Penalty-Enhancement for Crimes Against
Pregnant Women, supra note 38.
93
Feminist literature has long regarded the notion of autonomy with suspicion because it
disconnects individuals who are inherently interdependent from one another. This idea of
74
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reconceiving of the fetal “person” as a fundamentally relational entity,
dependent upon its mother for both identity and rights. Part B of this section
will take these concepts and construct a new theory grounded in relationality
called the Fetal-Maternal Identity Theory (FMIT).94 This theory proposes
that the relational fetal-maternal person would be granted the rights to be
protected against harm rather than any individual identity of the fetus. This
part applies FMIT to solve problems of justice caused by FPLs and will
conclude by analyzing the broader implications of adopting a relational
theory of fetal identity. This Comment argues that relational identity theory
will draw attention to the fact that the woman too is in relation to those around
her. Thus, responsibility for her and her fetus’s health lie not only on her
shoulders, but of those around her with whom she is in relation.
A. PREGNANCY, RELATIONALITY, AND CARE

Much of the discussion of legal personhood revolves around “justice”
theory concerning individual rights and duties.95 However, feminist scholars
have pointed out that often, justice discourse relies on concepts of rights and
autonomy that do not fully account for all experiences, particularly the
experiences of pregnant women.96 Traditional justice-based ethics is
autonomy is, according to these scholars, a characteristic of “masculinist” thinking and ideals.
That is, that theories of ethics and law based on assumptions about autonomy as an ideal
presuppose the concept of a self-sufficient individual, operating in a vacuum, unaffected by
social relationships. Atomistic conceptions of individuals eschew relational and emotional
thinking and, according to feminist scholars, strip individuals of their relations and emotions
to achieve an “abstract reasoner” liberated from the distortions of feelings and connection.
Recently, some feminists have sought to reintegrate autonomy into feminist theory and ethics
while still avoiding the pitfalls of atomistic thinking. These scholars use the term “relational
autonomy” to refer to feminist reconceptualization of autonomy which are contrasted to
notions of autonomy that presuppose atomistic conceptions of the self. See e.g., sources cited
supra note 23.
94
See infra Part II.B.
95
In basic terms, justice theory holds that each individual has an equal right to basic
liberties, and that they should have equal access to opportunities as other individuals of similar
ability. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 79 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971); Ruth
Anna Putnam, Why Not a Feminist Theory of Justice, in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM & JONATHAN
GLOVER, WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 298
(1995); sources cited supra note 7.
96
It should be noted that I will be following the literature in this regard and speaking of
pregnant bodies as “female” bodies. However, this is an oversimplification and a gloss that,
while convenient and common, ignores the experience of other non-female pregnant persons,
especially trans-men, in troubling ways. This Comment certainly does not solve this issue and
more work should and must be done to develop a feminist theory of relationality and
reproduction that accounts for more than only cis-women. However, despite the acute need
for such a theory, this paper will not undertake this project and use the terms available in the
discipline as they exist.
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exemplified in a tendency to use gender-neutral language in addressing issues
that nonetheless affect men and women differently, such as those involving
family and reproductive decisions.97 Therefore, for many feminist ethicists,
justice is an inadequate framework to attend to many social issues, especially
those that predominantly affect women.98 With that in mind, this Section will
refocus the discussion of personhood away from rights and duties and toward
relationships.
Feminist identity theorists have argued that there is a distinctively
feminine way of engaging with the world that is substantially different than
our present frameworks for understanding rights, responsibilities, and
identity.99 Feminist ethicists suggest an alternative framework for thinking
through social, legal, and ethical problems that would be grounded in care.100
Traditionally, justice frameworks have tended to rely on and reinforce gender
differences that contribute to social, legal, and economic disparities, whereas
care ethics would demand the elimination of social and economic disparities
that arise from gender differences.101 Moreover, while justice models tend to
view individuals atomistically, care models emphasize their relatedness to
97
Janice Moulton, The Myth of the Neutral ‘Man’, in MARY VETTERLING-BRAGGIN,
SEXIST LANGUAGE: A MODERN PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 100, 105 (1981); Adele Mercier, A
Perverse Case of the Contingent A Pariori: On the Logic of Emasculating Language (A Reply
to Dawkins and Dummett), 23 PHIL. TOPICS 2, 221, 230 (1995).
98
See, e.g., GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 24–64; NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 65–69
99
PETA BOWDEN, CARING: GENDER-SENSITIVE ETHICS 1, 21–60 (1997); DIEMUT ELISABET
BUBECK, CARE, GENDER, AND JUSTICE 1, 159–71, 189–242 (1995).
100
Care ethics is a normative, feminist ethical theory that holds that moral action centers
on interpersonal relationships and centers care or benevolence as a virtue. See, e.g., GILLIGAN,
supra note 23, at 24–64; NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 65–69; BOWDEN, supra note 99, at 21–
60; BUBECK, supra note 99, at 189–242. Care ethics has its roots in feminist circles of political,
legal, and medical ethics reasoning. While this Comment deals primarily with the implications
of approaching questions of identity and responsibility related to pregnancy from a legal
standpoint, many of the authors referenced in this Comment will be from disciplines outside
of the law, especially from medical ethics. Because pregnancy is undoubtedly both a social
and a biological phenomenon, it makes sense to take an interdisciplinary approach to
analyzing the legal and ethical dimensions of responsibility and identity in relation to
pregnancy.
101
Some scholars such as Anna Putnam, Martha Nussbaum, and Jonathan Glover, among
others, have attempted to “rehabilitate” justice-based reasoning traditions to move toward a
“feminist theory of justice” that draws on the work of John Rawls’ A THEORY OF JUSTICE to
develop a universalist version of justice that can account for a multiplicity of experiences in
ways that accommodate different identities while also providing a normative framework for
universal justice. RAWLS, supra note 95, at 79; Putnam, supra note 95, at 298. I find these
attempts to be unconvincing and choose rather to engage with explicitly relational-feminist
theoretical approaches to move beyond “justice talk” such as MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD,
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE: AN UNEQUAL MAJORITY 217–27 (1993); BOWDEN,
supra note 99, at 21–60; BUBECK, supra note 99, at 159–71, 189–242.
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one another through ties of blood, commitment, and affection.102 Such
theorists draw on a long tradition of reconsidering the demands of justice
based on contextual features rather than as a universal principle.103 If a
concept of equality is not blind to individual differences and context, and if
it extends beyond isolated selves to relationships among individuals, it can
be amenable to both egalitarian feminism and care-based models of moral
reasoning.104
One of the main differences between the experiences of men and women
that warrants the use of a care-based model of reasoning is the experience of
pregnancy.105 Pregnancy is one experience that is necessarily relational. As
Robin West has observed, “[w]omen are not essentially, necessarily,
inevitably, invariably, always, and forever separate from other human beings:
women, distinctively, are quite clearly ‘connected’ to another human life
when pregnant.”106 Pregnancy is a unique experience insofar as one party is
necessarily dependent upon the other for their existence and preservation.
The pregnant woman’s act of sustaining a fetus is an essentially physical,
rather than rational, act.107 And the relationship is not only relational but
constitutive. If the mother chooses to terminate her relationship with the
fetus, it is not just the relationship that ends, but so too does the existence of
one of the parties.
Additionally, the relationship between the mother and her fetus has a
form of interiority that is quite different from other relationships.108 The
fetus’s movements are entirely within the woman. She is the only person with
access to these moments and the only one who can bear such constant and
intimate witness to the life within her.109 Even when others gain access to
experience the movement of the fetus, it is under its mother’s direction.110

102

GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 26–64; NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 1, 65–69; MEDICINE
(Diana Fritz Cates & Paul Lauritzen eds., 2001).
103
SUSAN SHERWIN, NO LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE 13–58
(1992). This usage is also consistent with Michael Walzer’s notion of “complex equality.”
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 3–31
(1983); see also ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY 17, 191 (1984)
(outlining the notion of “sexual egalitarianism”).
104
West, supra note 24, at 2; Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 705.
105
West, supra note 24, at 1 (quoting Naomi Scheman, Individualism and the Objects of
Psychology, in DISCOVERING REALITY 255, 237 (Sandra Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds.,
1983)).
106
Id. at 21.
107
Id. at 8 (quoting Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 3 (1980)).
108
Tuerkheimer, supra note 24, at 705.
109
YOUNG, supra note 24, at 163.
110
Id. at 163–64.
AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 1–6
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This level of investment between two parties is fundamentally unique and
fundamentally relational. Therefore, it makes sense to apply a system of
moral reasoning to questions of reproduction and pregnancy that holds
relationality as a fundamental premise.111
B. FETAL-MATERNAL IDENTITY THEORY

Starting from the perspective that the relationship between the fetus and
the woman is fundamentally unique and unlike any other human relationship,
this Comment offers an alternative legal theory of fetal legal identity.
Specifically, the relationship theory, which this Comment calls the “FetalMaternal Identity Theory” (FMIT).112 FMIT proposes that, for legal
purposes, because of the necessary dependence of the fetus upon the woman,
the fetus is identical to the woman. A fetus, under this formulation, is viewed
as an entity that exists wholly in relation to its mother. Because the fetus is
necessarily reliant on the woman and not the other way around, the legal
identity of the fetus can be subsumed within the legal identity of the
mother.113 It can make no legal claims independent of the mother because its
fundamental existence is reliant on and at the pleasure of the woman.114
Because the fetus cannot exist without the woman who is carrying it, the fetus
is subsumed within the woman’s identity in the same way that an organ or
limb of the woman’s body would be.
One way to further illuminate this theory is by exploring it functionally
in relation to legal rights against harm. While an individual could be charged
with assault for harming a woman’s arm or charged with murder by
destroying her brain (and thereby causing death), the individual is not
charged with a separate crime or an elevated sentence for the injury of an
appendage or destruction of the organ in addition to the injury or death of the
woman. The harm is identified with the woman as a whole person because,
without the woman, the arm or brain would cease to have functional meaning.
Similarly, a fetus would be treated as legally identical to its mother. A woman
could be harmed by violence done to her that affects her gestating fetus or
could be killed, resulting in the death of her fetus. But, under FMIT, the
111
SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 13–28, 127–41
(1989); Minow & Shanley, supra note 29, at 23.
112
The reason that the term “fetal” proceeds the term “maternal” is not to suggest the
priority of the fetus over the mother, but rather to prioritize the term “fetus” in relation to the
term “identity.” Said another way, the order of the words is meant to suggest that the fetus
shares its identity with its mother, not the other way around. The fetus is identical to the
woman; the woman is not identical to the fetus.
113
KURKI, supra note 7, at 147–48.
114
Id.
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crimes would be attached to the mother, not to the fetus. Rather than, as some
states do, charging an individual with two counts of manslaughter for the
death of the fetus and the death of its mother, FMIT would charge only one
count for the death of the mother.115 Like any other part of the woman’s body,
the fetus, because of its necessary relationship to and reliance on the woman,
would be able to bear reference for harm caused to the woman. But the fetus
would not be afforded separate or additional rights.
This theory would have the further effect of avoiding the current
problem of prosecuting women for their own pregnancies.116 Under FMIT,
women could not be prosecuted for the harm to their own fetus because harm
caused to the fetus is ultimately harm to the mother. Though the mother may
have engaged in behavior that harmed the fetus, the focus under FMIT would
be on the harm the behavior caused to the woman. Women whose fetuses
died as a result of illicit drug use or self-harming behaviors could be treated
for the harm caused to themselves and receive social and psychological
support. But they would not face the threat of prosecution that they do under
the current system.117 This could have the beneficial effect of encouraging
more women to seek help for self-harming behaviors as they would no longer
have to fear retribution for harm done to their own fetus.
Moreover, the FMIT approach would accurately acknowledge that harm
caused to a fetus is just as much a failure to prevent harm to a woman. This
not only demonstrates that harming a fetus requires acting upon the mother,
but also centers the woman’s experience of harm and takes seriously the
physical and emotional suffering the woman could experience related to fetal
harm or death.
Ultimately, under FMIT, a woman could not be prosecuted for
behaviors that she engaged in solely on the grounds that they harmed the
fetus. There have been numerous cases where women have been prosecuted
for violence done to their fetuses either by physical harm,118 attempted

115

See infra Part II.
See infra Section IV.A.1.
117
Id.
118
See, e.g., Farah Stockman, Alabamians Defend Arrest of Woman Whose Fetus Died in
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/us/alabamawoman-marshae-jones.html [https://perma.cc/MQS6-FBGB].
116
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suicide,119 and drug use,120 all of which have been based on the theory that
the fetus is a separate entity from the mother. However, if the mother and
fetus were considered one singular maternal-fetal person, this harm would be
reconceived of as self-harm and would not warrant prosecution but rather
some form of care such as counselling or rehabilitative intervention. To
institute such a system of care and rehabilitation, the state would have to
move away from atomistic conceptions of justice and toward a relational
system of redistributed responsibility.121
C. RECONSIDERING AND REDISTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY

Along with traditional, atomistic concepts of justice, the recent
medicalization of pregnancy has reallocated the responsibility for fetal health
to the pregnant individual herself.122 Pregnancy has not always been
considered a medical condition.123 Indeed, for much of history, pregnancy
has been considered a social enterprise rather than a medical one. Doctors
were not often present during child birth unless there was an emergency.124
There was little in the way of prenatal care.125 And fertility and contraceptive
matters were not considered to be under the purview of physicians but rather
family members, midwives, and other community caregivers.126 The
medicalization of pregnancy has brought with it many benefits, from
decreased maternal mortality rates to better family planning practices and
fewer unwanted pregnancies.127 However, one negative side effect of the
medicalization of pregnancy has been the individualization of
119
See, e.g., Julie Rovner, Woman Who Tried to Commit Suicide While Pregnant Gets
Bail, NPR (May 18, 2012, 4:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2012/05/18/153026015/bail-granted-for-indiana-woman-charged-in-attempted-feticide
[https://perma.cc/9QVM-2XD4].
120
See, e.g., Take Action to Free Chelsea Becker, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT
WOMEN (June 17, 2020), https://www.nationaladvocatesforpregnantwomen.org/take-actionto-free-chelsea-becker/ [https://perma.cc/P7MB-8RMQ]; People v. Perez, No. F077851, 2019
WL 1349709, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2019).
121
GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 1, 24–64; NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 65–69; MEDICINE
AND THE ETHICS OF CARE, supra note 102, at 1–6.
122
Chris Shilling, Culture, the “Sick Role” and the Consumption of Health, 53 BRIT. J.
SOC. 621, 630 (2002).
123
See e.g., JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT , BROUGHT TO BED : CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA
1750–1950 36–64 (30th aniv. ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1986); CHARLOTTE G. BORST ,
CATCHING BABIES : THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF CHILDBIRTH 1870–1920 1–13 (1995).
124
LEAVITT , supra note 123, at 36–64.
125
Id. at 87–116.
126
Id. at 13–68.
127
William F. McCool & Sara A. Simerone, Birth in the United States: An Overview
of Trends Past and Present, 37 NURSING CLINICS N. AM . 735, 744–46 (2002).

424

GVOZDEN

[Vol. 112

responsibility.128 Where once entire communities that included any number
of individuals, such as the pregnant woman’s family, friends, neighbors, and
midwives, were involved in the pregnancy process, the medicalization of
pregnancy has localized the focus of health responsibility on the mother
exclusively.129
While FPLs take women to be solely responsible for the health and
safety of their fetus, there are, in fact, multiple intersecting parties that play
a role in the creation of the fetus and support of the woman. By focusing on
the woman as solely responsible, FPLs fail to appreciate the relational aspects
of pregnancy that suggest a more diffuse locus for responsibility.130
While classic biomedical ethicists Beauchamp and Childress largely
focus on justice as a matter between neutral individuals,131 feminist theory
adds another layer. Feminist medical ethics intervenes by contextualizing
medical decision-making within a larger web of social concerns particular to
a system embedded with hostility toward women.132 This framework offers
a conception of persons and their relationships that stresses what Susan M.
Wolf has referred to as “nesting rights in a community of caring.”133 This
restructured account of justice sees the system as not simply innocently and
unintentionally neglectful of women, but as actively hostile to them.134 As
such, in addition to theories of law and jurisprudence, systems of power must
be addressed as well. In this account, justice must be understood within the
context of systemic oppression. Thus, such an understanding would call into

128

CATHERINE MILLS, FUTURES OF REPRODUCTION 1, 6 (2011).
BORST , supra note 123, at 117–31.
130
GILLIGAN, supra note 23, at 1, 24–64; NODDINGS, supra note 23, at 65–69; MEDICINE
AND THE ETHICS OF CARE, supra note 102, at 1–6.
131
TOM BEAUCHAMP & JAMES CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 99–142 (8th
ed. 2019). Beauchamp and Childress are influential biomedical ethicists responsible for the
prevailing theory of medical ethics called principlism. This theory of ethics has four main
components: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice, which a medical
practitioner making ethical decisions are supposed to weigh and balance against each other to
come to an ethical solution. Principlism is the main mode of ethical reasoning taught to
medical students. This mode of ethical reasoning has dominated the ethical field since its
inception in 1979 through to its most recent edition published in 2019. In essence, principlism
as the primary mode of medical reasoning does not seem to be going away anytime soon.
132
SUSAN WOLF, FEMINISM & BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 67–95 (1996).
133
Susan Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of
Caring, 50 MD. L. REV. 798, 798–858 (1996).
134
Id.
129
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question the very structure in which goods are produced, assigned value, and
distributed.135
To solve this, this Comment proposes a framework of distributive
responsibility associated with feminist care ethics and theories of relational
identity. This means shifting focus from the woman as solely responsible for
fetal health and instead positioning the woman within a web of concern that
would involve not only the pregnant woman, her fetus, and her partner, but
also medical, economic, and housing systems, social supports, and laws and
law makers that in some way engage with and shape the experience of
pregnancy.136 In relational systems of identity, such as FMIT, individuals are
defined in relation to one another. This vision of relational identity, when
extended to theories of responsibility, suggests that rights and responsibilities
should similarly be conceptualized as relational rather than individual.137 It
is not merely the individual’s responsibility to care for their own safety and
health, but a social responsibility of an interconnected network of relevant
concerned parties to care for one another.138 An individual only has rights
and responsibilities in relation to others and thus the conditions of possibility
for their behavior are constituted by these relations as well.139 In the context
of pregnancy, a theory of relational-distributive justice would shift the focus
of responsibility away from the pregnant woman exclusively and redistribute
it among a larger network of social connections.140

135

RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE
SOCIAL SELF 52–72 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); SUSAN SHERWIN, THE
POLITICS OF WOMEN’S HEALTH: EXPLORING AGENCY AND AUTONOMY 19–48 (1998); WOLF,
supra note 132, at 67–95; MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH
CARE: AN UNEQUAL MAJORITY 24–42 (1993).
136
SHERWIN, supra note 135, at 48–64; RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF, supra note 135, at 52–72.
137
For a sampling of feminist scholars who suggest relational theories of responsibility,
see generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY (1991); VIRGINIA
HELD, RIGHTS AND GOODS: JUSTIFYING SOCIAL ACTION (1994); MOIRA GATENS, FEMINISM
AND PHILOSOPHY: PERSPECTIVES ON DIFFERENCE AND EQUALITY (1991); ROSEMARY TONG,
FEMININE AND FEMINIST ETHICS (1993).
138
See sources cited supra note 137.
139
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE
SOCIAL SELF, supra note 135, at 52–72.
140
See, e.g., Laura Valentini, Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map, 7 PHIL.
COMPASS 654, 658 (2012).
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III. FETAL-MATERNAL IDENTITY SOLVING PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE
A. MATERNAL-FETAL ANTAGONISM, POLICING PREGNANCY,
AND PROBLEMS IN MATERNAL-FETAL HARM

One consequence of viewing women and their fetuses as legally distinct
entities is that women and their fetuses are placed in an adversarial
relationship to one another. If the health or behavior of a woman threatens
the health or life of her fetus, she could be held responsible. In many states
with FPLs a woman can be criminally charged for harming her fetus, creating
an antagonistic relationship between the woman and her fetus by making
them competitors for rights that are necessarily connected.141 And while not
all politicians advocate for the punishment of women if they fail to comport
to certain behavioral standards, increasingly many do––as codified in
FPLs.142 Recent examples of women who have been prosecuted for harm to
their own fetuses under FPLs include the cases of Chelsea Becker, Adora
Perez, and Kelli Leever-Driskel.143 These cases involve pregnant women
prosecuted under FPLs that were not intended to punish them, and serve as
examples of how broken FPLs are and how FMIT might intervene to solve
these problems.
In September 2019, Chelsea Becker, pregnant and alone at a friend’s
house, thought her water had broken.144 But when she saw that she was
covered in blood, she knew that something had gone wrong.145 She was
immediately taken to the hospital by ambulance and about three hours later,

141

See e.g., ABBY SCHNELLER, PENALIZING PREGNANCY: A FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES
ANALYSIS OF PURVI PATEL’S CRIMINALIZATION 3, 24 (2018); McConnell, supra note 16, at
307; Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of Pregnancy, supra
note 16, at 1333.
142
See, e.g., State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 173–75 (S.C. 2003) (reaffirming a
conviction of homicide by child abuse for the mother’s use of crack cocaine during her
pregnancy); see also Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 630–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding
that a pregnant woman can be charged with murder after attempting suicide); Patel v. State,
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she delivered a stillborn baby boy.146 Chelsea was devastated for the loss of
her son, who had already been named Zachariah.147 Nearly two months later,
on November 6, 2019, Chelsea Becker was arrested and charged with murder
under California Penal Code § 187.148 Chelsea is still in prison now, with her
bail set at $2 million.149 Chelsea’s sentence follows another prosecution in
the same county that established a precedent in the area for prosecuting
mothers for the miscarriage of their unborn babies.150
On December 30, 2017, Adora Perez suffered a stillbirth.151 Alleging
that Ms. Perez’s drug use during pregnancy caused the stillbirth, the Kings
County, California District Attorney charged Ms. Perez with murder under
§ 187.152 Perez is now serving eleven years in state prison for a crime she
never intended to commit.153
Similarly, in Indiana, Kelli Leever-Driskel was arrested and formally
charged with “feticide” and involuntary manslaughter in connection with the
death of her son at birth.154 According to court documents, “a roommate told
police he was awakened [one night] by [Kelli] crying as she delivered what
appeared to be a full-term baby boy in the bathroom.”155 “The roommate said
the infant didn’t appear to be breathing and he called 911 . . . .”156 After her
146
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visit to the hospital, Kelli was arrested for feticide by drug use.157 However,
it is not clear that drugs actually caused the rupturing of the placenta that
occurred, as this can be a cause of premature birth in pregnant women for
any variety of non-drug related reasons.158 Nonetheless, Kelli was prosecuted
for an involuntary crime for which she could have faced up to twenty-and-ahalf years in prison.159 The case has since been dropped, but the possibility
of prosecuting women for their miscarriages still remains.160
In all three cases, the relevant FPLs had not been intended to be used
against women for harm caused to their own fetuses. The California statute
explicitly provides that no person “who commits an act that results in the
death of a fetus” can be guilty of murder where “[t]he act was solicited, aided,
abetted, or consented to by the mother of the fetus” and legislative history
demonstrates lawmakers’ intent to exempt mothers from prosecution for their
own acts that result in fetal death.161 Indiana law similarly states that their
FPL was not intended for use against women for harm caused to their own
fetuses, but nevertheless, states have continued to charge, prosecute, and
imprison women on precisely these grounds.162
The justification for prosecuting these women is entirely based on the
conceptualization of the fetus as a separate legal entity with separate legal
rights. In all of these cases, women were charged with crimes that resulted in
harm to a fetus as an independent entity.163 Indeed, “[t]he characterization of
maternal substance abuse as criminal directly reflects the model of the
maternal-fetal relationship as one of conflicting, autonomous bearers of
157
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rights.”164 The prosecution of women for miscarrying makes clear the
adversarial relationship between the rights afforded to a fetus and the rights
of the mother. Affording a fetus separate rights compels the woman to act on
her fetus’s behalf, constrains her behavior, and makes her responsible for the
health, safety, and well-being of another entity in the way that no other
individual has the duty to care or rescue.165
FMIT would solve this issue and redistribute care and responsibility to
better address the issue of maternal-fetal harm through violence and drug use.
FMIT would reinterpret these cases as issues of self-harm rather than fetal
harm because the woman and her fetus are legally identical entities. Had the
women harmed themselves in the commission of these actions, they would
not have been charged with a crime against themselves––assault against the
self through the use of substances has never been a crime. This approach both
prevents the mother from being criminally charged for what would now
constitute self-harm and more accurately apprehends the real suffering
experienced by the woman due to her addiction. Under a relational approach
to identity, the harm done by using drugs while pregnant “does not make the
woman’s addiction more criminal. Rather, it highlights the severity of her
disease.”166 The harm would, under FMIT, be reconsidered as self-harm
which would not require legal retribution but instead support and
rehabilitation to overcome.
Furthermore, a relational and redistributive approach to justice would
better address the problems of maternal drug use and self-harm. In essence,
such an approach would appreciate that “the solution to the problem of fetal
addiction is not further to deny women’s reproductive autonomy through
regulation, but to create the conditions necessary for women to choose a
healthy pregnancy.”167 At present, FPLs actually discourage women from
getting healthcare or seeking treatment for drug addiction during their
pregnancy for fear of being prosecuted for fetal abuse or feticide.168 Women
are receiving inadequate maternal healthcare and no addiction recovery
support during pregnancy because of the existing policies enshrined in
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FPLs.169 Under FMIT, women would no longer need to fear prosecution for
drug use during pregnancy and could seek out maternal healthcare and get
help with their addiction. At a basic level, promoting maternal health would
require revision of our current theory of fetal identity and the implementation
of new policies designed to provide prenatal care for women generally, to
meet the particular needs of pregnant addicts. Moreover, a relational and
redistributive approach to justice would center pregnant women within a
network of care in order to redistribute responsibility, provide better support,
and expand the conditions of possibility allowing for healing and a healthier
pregnancy.
B. PROBLEMS SOLVED BY REDISTRIBUTING RESPONSIBILITY

FPLs function within and perpetuate an existing system of unjust
discrimination against and oppression of women.170 As such, a model which
accounts for the injustices perpetrated on an individual level can only go so
far. Instead, any successful intervention must reconsider the source of the
problem: it is not individual women behaving badly that is the central cause
for concern.171 Instead, systemic stereotypes about women’s inherent duty to
care, the policing of pregnancy, and inadequate social support structures are
significant issues which, if addressed, would mitigate most if not all of the
foundational problems that lead to prosecutions under FPLs in the first place.
After refocusing the locus of concern, the unjust exclusive focus on
women must be addressed. First, as significant contributors to pregnancy,
men must be brought into the fold and held responsible for sexual practices
as well.172 This means not only providing education about and access to
contraception for women but also for men.173 Next, at a systems level, issues
of distributive injustice must be addressed so that individuals have equal
access to adequate sexual education, affordable contraceptives, reproductive
healthcare, and structural support. And finally, all of this must be done under
the umbrella of feminist biomedical ethics theory acknowledging that the
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current formulation of FPLs function within the context of an oppressive
system and serve to perpetuate oppression.
1. Social Assumptions about Care and Maternal Responsibility
The most logical place to begin this analysis is with a discussion of
stereotypes about female care and responsibility. Related to, and perhaps in
part as a result of, the uniquely female capacity to become pregnant and
engage in one of the most fundamentally “relational relationships,” the
female social experience has become marked, not just by the unique
biological capacity to care, but imbued with social presumptions about the
naturalness of female caregiving.174 The social presumption that women will
altruistically care for those around them is borne out in a number of
observable ways. Women still bear the brunt of responsibility for unpaid
childcare in the United States and globally.175 Women generally are
responsible for maintaining connections with extended families, which
means that when parents and in-laws eventually need care, it is generally
women who facilitate and take on the majority of this care.176 Women visit
the doctor more frequently than men for preventative care, meaning that, on
the whole, women are healthier than their male partners for longer, which
results in women bearing the brunt of at-home medical care later in their
lives.177 These social presumptions are reflexive and reinforcing in that as
women are conditioned to be social caregivers, they perform these social
functions, which reinforces the myth of the naturalness of female care and
propagates the myth further.178 This myth can be seen in the compelled care
that results from the codification and implementation of FPLs.179
While compelled maternal care tracks and reinforces social
presumptions and patterns, it nonetheless ignores the lived experiences of
174
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women who are induced to care for their fetus and punished for failure to do
so. Pregnancy takes a serious physical and emotional toll on women that is
largely overlooked by insisting that caring is the natural disposition of a
woman and presuming the naturalness of female altruism.180
To illustrate this point, there is no discernable pattern among states that
institute FPLs of any increase in funding for such social support services as
healthcare, prenatal services, women’s health services, childcare, affordable
housing, food, and education, among others, that would support a woman in
her experience of pregnancy and potential experience as a parent.181 Instead,
the law treats the woman as autonomous and all powerful caregiver in that it
presumes that she will naturally and altruistically care for the fetus while she
is pregnant as a matter of course. After pregnancy, however, it treats her as a
self-reliant, independent individual that is afforded no additional support.182
Ironically, by treating the woman as an atomistic individual, the law actually
decreases rather than increases female autonomy. The universe of
possibilities is substantially narrowed for women when social conditions
presume that they will naturally and altruistically care for not only those
around them but also the fetuses they bear.183 Without providing the pregnant
woman with social support in her uniquely relational condition and instead
making her uniquely responsible for the health and safety of her fetus, the
conditions for thriving are substantially narrowed for her.184
At bottom, this problem arises because the fetus is considered a separate
individual from the woman but one who is still entitled to the woman’s care.
By holding the woman responsible for the wellbeing of the fetus as an
independent agent, the law illustrates that it is willing to apply relational
thinking to the rights of the fetus but not the woman.185 The woman stands
on her own as solely responsible for the health and safety of the fetus as the
fetus stands in necessary relationship with the woman.186
2. Relational Responsibility for Health and Safety
To solve these problems the first step is to reconsider the maternal-fetal
bond through FMIT and recenter the locus of care from the fetus to the
woman. This enables a wider network of care givers and no longer implicates
180
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the woman individually as care provider. When the fetus is considered a
separate entity, it is easy to see why intuitively it falls on the woman alone to
care for the fetus: the woman has exclusive access to the fetus physically and
psychologically in ways that no one else does, and has control over what the
fetus ingests and is exposed to at the near exclusion of any other person.187
However, when the fetus is reconsidered as essentially identical to the
woman because of its necessary dependence upon her, the woman becomes
the focus of care and more individuals have the capacity to relate to and care
for her. Now, in relation to the fetal-maternal person, care and responsibility
can be redistributed among more participants, including notably, the father.
Men, who contribute significantly to pregnancy,188 can now be included
in the network of caregivers, even before the fetus exists. Bearing
responsibility for the woman and, more abstractly, their part in reproduction,
men alongside women become responsible for making sensible decisions
about reproduction, including preventing unplanned or unwanted
pregnancies.189 Men, in this system, must be responsible for their part in
reproduction by becoming educated on and engaging in safe sexual
practices.190 The sexual partners become entangled in a network of mutual
care bound by their responsibility for one another to avoid risk and harm
caused by a potential pregnancy.
Should pregnancy occur, either planned or unplanned, the man is still
implicated in the care network. Now with the woman and fetus considered
legally identical, the man has more concrete ways of caring for the maternalfetal person than he would have in caring for the fetus as a separate entity.
Under FMIT, the man is responsible for caring for this new maternal-fetal
person, created, in part, through his behavior, by providing psychological,
physical, and economic support, or at least by abstaining from behaviors that
would cause the person harm. The responsibilities to the woman have
changed because the relationship has changed. Because the man has, through
his own action, transformed the relationship with the woman through the
creation of a fetus, his relationship with the woman has taken on a new
meaning and thus new responsibilities. While the man would not have been
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able to directly provide care to a fetus that was an entity internal to but
separate from its mother, the man can and should directly provide care for
the maternal-fetal person with whom he has created a new, responsibilityproducing relationship.
3. Distributive Justice, Revising Systems and Providing Support
Similarly, while society at large would not have been able to directly
care for the fetus were it considered a separate entity shut off from the world
by virtue of inhabiting its mother, FMIT would refocus attention to the
mother and allow the larger society to care for her directly. While an
individual man becomes responsible for the care of an individual woman by
virtue of the changed relationship through the creation of the fetus and
imposition of new responsibilities, society, inversely, becomes responsible
for the care of the fetus through an already existing responsibility to the
woman. Social contracts that bound society to caring for the woman now
bind society to caring for the new maternal-fetal person and providing for her
new needs and protecting her in her newly heightened state of vulnerability.
This means that society, once responsible for providing access to adequate
individual healthcare to the woman, is now responsible for providing
adequate maternal-fetal healthcare. Similarly, society is now responsible for
the provision of food, economic security, and protection from violence and
discrimination for the maternal-fetal person. The fact that society imperfectly
provides these supports now is not an indictment of relational responsibility
or FMIT, but rather simply illustrates the state’s failing to provide adequate
care to its citizens at present. Imperfect performance of a duty does not
abdicate responsibility. Indeed, this merely suggests that rather than spending
resources on punishing women for harming their fetuses in a system that
considers the two to be separate entities, the state would be better served by
and in better service of its duties by reallocating those resources toward better
provision of basic needs to maternal-fetal persons and all citizens more
generally.
IV. RESPONDING TO POSSIBLE CRITIQUES
Despite the problems that applying care ethics, responsibility
reallocation, and revised identity theory to the issues caused by FPLs would
solve, there remain some unanswered questions, room for skepticism, and
areas of concern or critique. This Part attempts to answer those questions,
allay some skepticism, and preempt possible critiques thoroughly and
succinctly.
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A. DEFINING HUMAN LIFE

One may argue that by defining the fetus and the woman as identical in
relation to the mother, the theory still engages the state in inappropriate
determinations of when human life begins.
However, an important distinction should be made: FMIT is a theory
not about defining life but about defining rights. There is a difference
between “personhood” and rights bearing.191 Being human does not
automatically convey all rights––children, non-citizens, and individuals
deemed “mentally incompetent” do not bear the same rights.192 The
difference between rights-bearing humans and limited-rights-bearing
humans does not depend on a difference in status as human but some other
status––citizenship, age, capacity, etc.193 Similarly, the conveyance of rights
does not imply humanity––animals, environment, companies etc.194 It is a
mistake to personify all entities that receive certain rights. This does not mean
that a fetus is not human, simply that the law is agnostic on the matter and
that, substantively, it does not matter for the provision of rights.
B. INCREASING HARM AND PREVENTING INTERVENTION

Supporters of FPLs and the retributive prosecution of pregnant women
for harm to their own fetuses might worry that the elimination of FPLs that
allow for the prosecution of women who use drugs or alcohol during
pregnancy would increase harm and leave no mechanism for intervention.
However, the elimination of FPLs that demand prosecution of women
who use drugs or alcohol during pregnancy does not mean that no
intervention is possible, but merely shifts the form of intervention and
intervening body. Modes of intervention would shift from retribution to
rehabilitation and protection and the intervening system would shift from law
enforcement to public health organizations. So, if, for instance, a woman
harmed her fetus in an attempted suicide by ingestion of a poisonous
substance, intervention would still be warranted, but justified on different
grounds and aimed at different outcomes.195
C. THREAT TO ABORTION RIGHTS?

One critique of relational theories of maternity might be the concern that
under FMIT, abortion would now constitute “harm to the self” requiring
191
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protective intervention effectively limiting or eliminating abortion rights.
However, as alluded to above, considering the fetus as identical to the mother
does not imply that the mother is identical to the fetus. The fetus is
necessarily dependent upon the woman––the woman is not necessarily
dependent upon the fetus. The existence of the fetus is at the discretion of the
mother––the existence of the woman is not at the discretion of the fetus.
Additionally, abortion would not be considered “harm” to the woman.
Childbirth, in fact, is much more dangerous than abortion.196 Pregnancy
carries with it inherent physical and psychological dangers that abortion does
not.197 For instance, a woman is fourteen times more likely to die from
carrying a pregnancy to term than from getting an abortion.198 Moreover,
harms that could incidentally be caused from an abortion can be easily
mitigated through simple medical intervention.199 In fact, the termination of
a pregnancy could be considered risk-mitigating, like similar elective
procedures such as prophylactic hysterectomies or mastectomies.
D. ONE LESS PROTECTION

One final, and perhaps the strongest critique among the ones listed here,
is the concern that because the law already fails to protect women from
violence––especially women of color––eliminating FPL just strips an
additional form of protection. However, as demonstrated above, FPLs do not
actually function as protection for women200 and in fact systemically
disadvantage women of color to a greater extent than white women.201 And
history demonstrates that pregnancy does not actually afford extra protection
and in fact leads to the violent violation of basic rights, especially among
women of color.202
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CONCLUSION
Debates over fetal personhood have been dominated by three major
viewpoints: that a fetus has the same rights as a live child; that a fetus has no
rights; or that a fetus has increasing moral status with advancing gestation.203
But each of these ways views the fetus, to some degree, as an independent
entity with separate identity from its mother. In response, FPLs were passed
to protect the rights of the fetal legal person.204 However, these laws create
an antagonistic relationship between the fetus and its mother under which a
woman can be prosecuted for harm to her own fetus, causing unequal
protection for pregnant versus non-pregnant persons. Similarly, because of
social presumptions about gender and care and the separateness of the fetus
and its internal unreachability by other individuals, the pregnant woman has
been encumbered with exclusive responsibility to care for and prevent harm
to her fetus.
To solve these problems, this Comment has proposed a new approach
to fetal identity that relies on relationships rather than autonomy to locate
rights and responsibilities. Under FMIT, the fetus and its mother are legally
identical because of the necessary dependence of the fetus on its mother. This
means not only that a mother cannot be prosecuted for harming the fetus, as
it is not a separate, rights bearing entity, but also that now more individuals
have the capacity and responsibility to care for the maternal-fetal person. By
focusing on the relationship between the fetus and its mother and
redistributing responsibility, this theory takes seriously the uniqueness of the
fetal-maternal relationship, acknowledges the inherent risks and
vulnerabilities associated with pregnancy, and involves more individuals in
a network of responsibility to care for the vulnerable life. This theory
prevents harm, better appreciates the relationships and vulnerabilities created
by pregnancy, and effectively redistributes responsibility to provide more
and better care.
However, work on FPLs cannot end here. Even if the law were to adopt
a new theoretical grounding for fetal identity and rights like FMIT, there are
still structural inadequacies that would prevent women from getting the
healthcare necessary to preserve both their and their fetuses’ health.
Redistributing maternal responsibility would require the state to invest in
healthcare in ways that it has declined to do. Reproductive healthcare access
is woefully inadequate in the United States. Not to mention the serious
inadequacies in access to healthy food, safe housing, social services,
203
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including protective services from abuse, drug counseling, and rehabilitation
that women face. Rethinking the way that we conceive of fetuses is one step
toward protecting women from unjust prosecution, but it is certainly not the
last step. Perhaps rethinking our model of responsibility to focus more on
relationships rather than the individual would be enough to provide
incentives and motivation to restructure systems that are at present
inadequate. It is at least an essential element to such work. But while
rethinking systems of responsibility, relationality, and identity is an essential
element of structural transformation, there is much more work to be done to
really protect pregnant women during what is a particularly vulnerable time
in their lives. To that end, this author cannot, at present, do more than look
forward hopefully.

